Capital grants to subcentral governments aim to increase their investment. However, they may try to allocate additional resources to cut saving or deficit, reducing self-financed investment and generating a crowing-out effect on regional public investment. Using data for Spanish Autonomous Communities (ACs) during 1984-1999, the effect of capital transfers on regional public capital spending, saving, and deficit is estimated. Econometric results point out that capital grants are not relevant to explain the dynamics of saving, but they are negative and significant in deficit regressions once institutional differences among ACs are controlled for.
I. INTRODUCTION
The effects of grants on fiscal choices are analysed in two fields of economic research. Fiscal federalism investigates the consequences of different kind of grants on expenditures made by subcentral governments. This topic is included in classical handbooks as Oates (1972) , King (1984) and Wildasin (1986) and it has been the object of a huge number of theoretical and empirical studies 1 . Besides, specialists on economic development are concerned with the fiscal effects of international aid -grants and loans-in recipient countries. Papers by Heller (1975) , Gang and Khan (1991) , Rothenberg (1990, 1993) , Khan and Hoshimo (1992) , and Otim (1996) are good examples. Both approaches seem useful to study regional policy EU style, a sort of financial relations placed between intergovernmental relations and international aid, based on grants and built on co-ordination among several levels of government.
The aim of this paper is the analysis of the effects of capital grants on fiscal choices made by the Spanish regional governments during the period 1984-1999. In particular, I am interested in the question of fungibility of grants-in-aid and the relevance of crowding-out or crowding-in effects on self-financed investment. Section two presents the main institutional features of fiscal federalism and regional policy in Spain. Section three is devoted to present a simple model of choices on public spending composition and data used. Econometric results are discussed in section four. Section five concludes.
II. FISCAL FEDERALISM AND REGIONAL POLICY IN SPAIN: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Regional policy in Spain is based on capital transfers to regional governments 2 from the Central government and the EU. Certainly, some grants from the EU cover current spending; central government makes other kind of efforts to correct differences in regional levels of development, like tax incentives and direct investment 3 ; and not all capital grants obey to the aim of stimulate economic growth in poor regions. But talking about regional policy in Spain is, above all, talking about the financing of regional public investment; and vice versa.
The Spanish and European regional policies are designed in a complementary way and oriented towards the poorest regions. Castilla y Leon, Castilla-La Mancha and Aragón. Central Government has been faster 6 Navarra and País Vasco amount to around 7% of total Spanish population and 8% of Spanish GDP. Their contribution to finance public services in the poor regions is neatly lower than the corresponding to regions with similar per capita GDP but under the Common Regime, as Cataluña. 7 The three provincial governments in Pais Vasco collect the taxes and transfer the lion's share the regional government, because the later detain the most important spending powers. 8 In 2002 the system has been deeply modified to lessen vertical fiscal imbalances, but it is irrelevant for the sample used in this paper.
devolving powers to the former group. Since the cession of health services to the other group in 2002, and setting aside some regional particularities 9 , a high homogeneity of powers has been attained.
iii) The third asymmetry is reflected into the wide vertical imbalance suffered by the common ACs. The strong devolution of spending powers has not been accompanied by a decentralization of the tax system. The financial dependence from the State seems to have no parallels across the world. More than 70 per cent of common ACs public spending in 1999 was financed by means of grants 10 . Public debt has been the real source of autonomy for regional government before then.
III. THE MODEL AND DATA
Owing to the asymmetries mentioned above, the models usually used in the evolution of saving has basically depended on the dynamics of current grants and current expenditures.
For all these reasons, foral ACs have been excluded and an approach analogous to that proposed by Rothenberg (1990 and , outlining the trade-offs in the composition of spending and revenues, is followed.
Regional governments aiming the maximization of social welfare should solve the following problem
where W is social welfare; I is investment; T are capital grants; D is deficit; and S is saving.
Regional governments bear another constraint. Their investment must exceed the level of capital inflow and required counterpart expenditures attached to grants included in ESF and CI programs 1 1
(1 )
where i i m T ⋅ is the counterpart required to the AC corresponding to the i-th capital transfer (T i ). Anyway, as in Heller (1975) , this proves to be a nonbinding constraint for the present sample. It would be probably more relevant to understand the value of T since ACs could refuse transfers if the level of required self-financed investment were too high 12 .
Regional governments aiming welfare maximization will fix investment, saving and deficit to balance their marginal effects on welfare in absolute value:
and meet their budget constraints. Because saving is the difference between current grants (G), own taxes (TA), and current expenditures (C):
S G TA C = + − , governments will choose the optimal composition of saving to get:
According to this model of fiscal choices and data, relative cost of TA in terms of social welfare would have been extremely burdensome for the ACs in the past.
Variations in the volume of capital grants alter optimal values for endogenous variables. What is the effect of an increase in transfers? It should rise capital spending because it must be legally used to finance it and because of financial participation of ACs in plans. Nevertheless, an increase in resources should be distributed among different uses to hold welfare maximization conditions. If self-financed capital spending before the rise in grants is higher than obligatory regional participation in projects financing Let us suppose that regional governments take lagged values of fiscal variables as initial references for their optimal choices 13 , adapting them to individual and common innovations. Capital grants must be included in the first category. Additional variables to proxy individual innovations have been considered. The more powers are devolved and global resources are disposable, the more capacity and need there is to allocate money to capital spending (Lago-Peñas, 2001a) . Hence, the incorporation of public consumption (C) and a dummy variable (POW), adopting value 1 for ACs enjoying a higher level of powers from the early stages of the decentralization process and 0 for the rest, has been explored.
regions. He argues a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods. Therefore, exogeneity of T should be tested.
In the case of D, the debt stock, proxied by the ratio E = debt stock total current resources , could affect the cost of additional debt. When the ratio grows, interest rates would tend to rise (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) , and the worry of voters about future taxes and debt sustainability would increase (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986) .
The effects of reforms in the Spanish intergovernmental fiscal relations, the incidence of limits to regional deficits, progressively stronger in Spain since 1992 (Vallés, 2002) , and the consequences of Spanish economic cycles and long-run growth on regional public revenues and expenditures would be examples of common innovations. Temporal fixed effects are included in regressions to control for them.
Therefore, equations to estimate are the following
where X i are a set of dummies adopting value 1 for observations in year t and 0 for the rest, and Z i are other control variables.
For reduction of panel heterogeneity and comparability of figures across ACs and time, all data are expressed in pesetas, on per capita basis, and in real terms by deflating the current values using the national public consumption deflator. Data for public consumption, saving, deficit, capital spending and capital grants were derived from the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (MEH, several years, www.meh.es) and data for debt from the Banco de España (BDE, several years, www.bde.es). Capital spending comprises net direct spending and capital grants to other agents. Regional populations and price 13 As in Heller (1975) and Otim (1996) .
deflator were taken from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, www.ine.es). Data were obtainable for 1984-1999.
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The evolution of time period specific means and standard deviations are showed in figure The results of ADF tests designed by Levin and Lin (1992) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (see Chiang and Kao, 2000) are summarised in table 6. Variable E would be integrated of order 1 or I(1) and the rest would be I(0).
The OLS estimation of equation (1) The variance estimator proposed by White (1980) is robust to heteroscedasticity within each cross-section, but does not account for contemporaneous cross-section correlations. And there are a number of potential pitfalls associated with the application of SUR weighted least squares (sometimes referred to as the Parks estimator) with a small number of time periods as in this case (Beck et al, 1993; Beck and Katz, 1995) . For this reason, they propose to retain OLS parameter estimates, replacing the OLS standard errors with panel-corrected standard errors. The new "robust" covariance matrix is
where covariances σ ij are estimated using OLS residuals.
More recently, Greene (1997) have suggested the use of FGLS to correct by crosssection heteroscedasticity in parameter estimates, replacing the estimated covariance matrix
where r ij are the correlation coefficients and s ii and s ij are the covariances derived from the FGLS residuals.
Under each estimated coefficient in table 6 appear, in parenthesis, the t-statistic computed using the standard OLS covariance matrix or the FGLS covariance matrix and, in brackets, the t-statistics derived from equations (4) and (5) As it is known, F-statistics are valid only if it is possible to assume that the errors are independent and identically normally distributed. As an alternative, Wald appropriated tests were implemented. Results appear below the corresponding to the F-statistics of homogeneity. Previous conclusions in this respect may be hold.
Estimations reflect that short-run multiplier of T on I is 0.4 but long-run multiplier 1
While previous comments about the specification of the econometric model are basically the same for estimations of equation (3) displayed in columns 7 to 10, they differ for estimations of equation (2) Unfortunately, as it is well known, using the standard within-group estimator for dynamic models with fixed individual effects generates inconsistent estimates. Nickell (1981) shows that when ρ is positive, the bias on ρ is negative. The inclusion of exogenous variables makes the bias larger in absolute value. The bias onβ depends on the 16 The following t-statistic was computed deriving variances and covariances from equations (4) and (5)ˆ1ˆv ar( ) var( ) 2 cov( , )
sign of the relationship between the exogenous variable and the lagged endogenous. When they are positively related, the coefficient will be upward biased and vice-versa 17 .
What are the implications of these results for estimations of equation (2) including individual fixed effects? On the one hand, ρ is downward biased because 0 ρ > . On the other, supposing β <0, β would be downward biased and then β β > . Combining this result with the low value of β in both equations and its low statistical significance, one must conclude that T has no a significant effect on S 18 .
Some comments about the set of control variables. Temporal fixed effects are highly significant in general, but not C. Moreover, bear in mind that variable C is I(1) and variable I behaves as an I(0) process. Variable E was excluded from deficit regressions because of multicollinearity problems. The coefficient of determination for the regression of E on the other regressors was around 0.6; which is higher than the overall R 2 .
Dummy variable POW is highly significant in deficit regressions. Its inclusion reinforces the relevance of T in such a way that it becomes not possible to reject its statistical significance at usual levels. Transfers would have contributed to cut deficit.
Summarising, capital grants are not relevant to explain the dynamics of S but they are significant in deficit regressions when variable POW is included. Each additional euro granted to ACs lessens deficit around 0.1 euro in the short-run. Anyway, while the shortrun multiplier of T on I is around 0.4 long-run multiplier would not be different to 1.
Therefore it would be possible to discard crowding-out or crowding-in effects in the long 17 According to Nickell (1981) , the bias is given by
where matrices X % and y % represents the mean differenced X and y.
18 If β >0 thenβ > β due to the direction of the bias. But estimations show that β ≤ 0.
run. All results were basically the same when the sample was split into two intervals : 1984-1991 and 1992-1999 .
V. CONCLUSIONS
Capital grants are implemented to increase and promote investments carried on by recipients. Conditions on the use of financial aid are imposed to avoid the employment of additional resources to cut taxes, reduce deficit, or increase public consumption. In spite of it, governments may try to obviate legal constraints by altering their self-financed investment.
Using data for Spanish ACs during the period 1984-1999, I have found that the dynamics of saving has not been systematically affected by the evolution of capital grants.
On the contrary, increases in capital transfers have involved a lower deficit.
Anyway, the existence of a crowding-out effect in the long-run is rejected by data.
In general, ACs do not respond automatically to ups and downs in the volume of capital grants modifying their investments in the same amount. ACs seem to soften the effects of grants on fiscal variables but they do not substitute self-financed investment by grants in the long-run. According to the results presented above, capital grants programmes would have been successful in promoting the accumulation of public capital stock by ACs. Levin and Lin (1992) . With intercept and no time trend. LL(2): ADF test suggested by Levin and Lin (1992) . With intercept and time trend. LL(3): ADF test suggested by Levin and Lin (1992) . With fixed effects and individual time trends. IPS: ADF test suggested by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1995) . With time trend. (*) The asterisk indicates rejections of unit root at the 1% level (*), or 5% level (**).
All tests have been implemented using the Gauss program written by Chiang and Kao (2000) . Notes: Below each coefficient appears, in parenthesis, standard t-statistics and, in brackets, robust t-statistics calculated using equation (4) and (5) of the text. F ai=a and F bi=b are F-statistics to test the null hypothesis of homogeneity of constants and slopes, respectively. W ai=a and W bi=b are Wald statistics appropriated to test homogeneity of parameters when errors are not independent and identically normally distributed. B-G is the statistic corresponding to the Breusch-Godfrey test on the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation. LM corresponds to a Lagrange multiplier test on the null hypothesis of cross-section homocedasticity. λ LM is the statistic corresponding to a Lagrange multiplier test on the null hypothesis of contemporaneous uncorrelation of residuals. H is the statistic corresponding to the Hausman test on the null hypothesis of exogeneity of T. R 2 is the coefficient of determination. OLS and FGLS means Ordinary Least Squares and Feasible Generalized Least Squares, respectively. Whitin indicates OLS estimation after substracting the "within" mean of each variable. Within* indicates FGLS estimation after substracting the "within" mean of each variable.
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